We consider competition among n sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots (or shelf space). We study how bundling a¤ects competition for slots. When the buyer has k number of slots, e¢ciency requires the slots to be allocated to the best k products. We …rst …nd that without bundling, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often ine¢ cient. Each seller has an incentive to bundle his products since bundling reduces competition from rival products. Furthermore, under bundling, an e¢ cient equilibrium always exists. In particular, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are e¢ cient if …rms do not use slotting contracts. However, ine¢ cient equilibria can exist if …rms use slotting contracts. We also identify portfolio e¤ects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal merger. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications on bundling and slotting contracts in terms of allocation of slots and foreclosure.
Introduction
There are many situations in which sellers with di¤erent portfolios of products compete for limited slots (or shelf space) of a buyer who wants to build up her own portfolio of distinct products. In this situation, sellers may employ bundling as a strategy to win the competition for slots. Even though bundling has been a major antitrust issue and a subject of intensive research, to the best of our knowledge, the literature seems to have paid little attention to competition among portfolios of distinct products and, in particular, no paper seems to have studied how bundling a¤ects portfolios'competition for slots. In this paper, we attempt to provide a new perspective on bundling by addressing this issue. Examples of situations we described above are abundant both among digital products and among physical products. For instance, in the movie industry, each movie distributor has a portfolio of distinct movies and buyers (either movie theaters or TV stations) have limited slots. More precisely, the number of movies that can be projected in a season (or in a year) by a theater is constrained by time and the number of projection rooms. Likewise, the number of movies that a TV station can show during prime time of a season (or year) is also limited. Actually, allocation of slots in movie theaters has been one of the main issues raised in the movie industry during the last presidential election in France 1 . Furthermore, bundling in the movie industry (known as block booking 2 ) was declared illegal in two supreme court decisions in U.S.: Paramount Pictures (1948), where blocks of …lms were rented for theatrical exhibition, and Loew's (1962) , where blocks of …lms were rented for television exhibition. In addition, recently in MCA Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp. (11th Circuit, April 1999), the court of appeals rea¢ rmed the per se illegal status of block booking.
A di¤erent situation we have in mind is that of manufacturers'competition for retailers' shelf space. Manufacturers having a large portfolio of products may practice bundling (often called full-line forcing) to win the competition for slots 3 and there has been antitrust cases 1 Cahiers du Cinema (April, 2007) proposes to limit the number copies per …lm since certain movies by saturating screens limits other …lms'access to screens and asks each presidential candidate's opinion about the policy proposal. 2 Block booking refers to "the practice of licensing, or o¤ering for license, one feature or group of features on the condition that the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features released by distributors during a given period" (Unites States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948) ). 3 For instance, Procter and Gamble uses 'golden-store'arrangement such that to be considerd a golden store, a retailer must agree to carry 40 or so P&G items displayed together. See "P&G has big plans for the shelves of tiny stores in emgering nations", Wall Street Journal, July 17, 2007. related to this practice 4 . For instance, the French Competition Authority …ned Société des Caves de Roquefort for using selectivity or exclusivity contracts with supermarket chains. 5 Furthermore, slotting arrangements, the payment by manufacturers for retail shelf space, have become increasingly important and have been the subject of recent antitrust litigations 6 and the focus of Federal Trade Commission studies. 7 In our model, we assume away buyer's private information, which allows us to depart from the existing literature on bundling that usually considers a framework of seconddegree price discrimination and to identify what seems to us a …rst-order e¤ect of bundling. Actually, in the case of movie industry, Kenney and Klein (1983) point out that second-order price discrimination explanation of bundling is inconsistent with the facts of Paramount and Loew's since the prices of the blocks varied a great deal across markets. Furthermore, in the Digital era, the prices are more and more tailored to buyers'characteristics as in the case of pricing of academic journals (Edlin and Rubinfeld 2004, Jeon and Menicucci 2006) .
We consider a simultaneous pricing game among n sellers (or …rms) who sell their products to a buyer having k(> 0) number of slots. Each seller i has a portfolio of n i distinct products. We assume that the prototype of each product is already made and call a product a digital good (a physical good) if the cost of producing a copy is zero (strictly positive). The buyer has a unit demand for each product. In our setting, a product needs to occupy a slot to generate a value. Products have heterogenous values and the values are independent. 8 Social e¢ ciency requires the slots to be allocated to the best k products among all products. In this setup, we study how the outcome of competition depends on the nature of the products (digital goods versus physical goods) and di¤erent contractual arrangements between each seller and the buyer.
Given a portfolio of products belonging to a …rm, we de…ne bundling as a menu contract that speci…es a price for every subset of the portfolio. A particular class of bundling contracts is what we call "independent pricing plus a …xed fee". A strategy in this class consists of a …xed fee for the right to buy products in the portfolio and one individual price for each product. There are three interesting special cases of this class. Individual pricing corresponds to the case with zero …xed fee; pure bundling corresponds to the case with zero individual prices; a "technology-renting"strategy is the case in which each individual price is equal to the cost of production. Interestingly, the change from independent pricing to bundling opens a new contractual dimension, i.e. contracting on slots. Note that under independent pricing, the buyer will purchase only those products that would occupy a slot and therefore slotting contracts are redundant. In contrast, under bundling, for instance, if all …rms o¤er pure bundles, the buyer may end up buying more products than the slots and hence we need to distinguish bundling with slotting contracts and bundling without slotting contracts. A slotting contract is de…ned such that if a bundle is sold with a slotting contract, the buyer must allocate a slot to each product in the bundle: exclusive dealing corresponds to a special case in which the number of products in the bundle sold with a slotting contract is equal to k. Therefore, the contractual space increases as we move from individual pricing to bundling without slotting contracts and from bundling without slotting contracts to bundling with the permission of slotting contracts.
Our main results are the following. First, under independent pricing, equilibrium (in pure strategy) often does not exist and hence the outcome is often ine¢ cient. 9 Second, each …rm has an incentive to use bundling instead of independent pricing since bundling reduces competition from rival products. Third, when bundling is allowed, there always exists an e¢ cient equilibrium where each …rm uses a technology-renting strategy, regardless of whether or not …rms can use slotting contracts. Our technology-renting equilibrium generalizes the marginal cost pricing result 10 in the literature on competition in non-linear pricing (Armstrong-Vickers, 2001 , 2008 and Rochet-Stole 2002 to a situation in which any number of …rm can sell any number of products. Furthermore, if all products are digital goods, all equilibria are e¢ cient as long as slotting contracts are prohibited. However, if sellers use slotting contracts, ine¢ cient equilibria can arise even in the case of digital goods. For physical goods, we …nd a condition that makes all equilibria e¢ cient. Fourth, we identify portfolio e¤ects of bundling and analyze the implications on horizontal merger. By 9 In section 3 we give an example in which no equilibrium in pure strategy exists while the e¢ cient allocation of slots is deterministic. 10 Charging the variable price(s) equal to the (constant) marginal cost(s) is equivalent to renting the production technology.
portfolio e¤ects of bundling, we mean that even though two …rms end up selling products of identical values to the buyer, they can realize di¤erent pro…ts if their portfolios are di¤erent in terms of the products that are not sold. We show that because of the portfolio e¤ects, …rms have an incentive to merge. Furthermore, when we endogenize the merger by considering the auction of a given product, we …nd that the …rm with the strongest portfolio wins the auction, suggesting a tendency of increasing concentration. One interesting theoretical result is that there is an intermediate level of contractual space such that decreasing or increasing contractual space beyond this level can hurt ef-…ciency. For instance, in the case of digital good, all equilibria are e¢ cient if bundling is allowed and slotting contracts are forbidden. On the one hand, if bundling is forbidden, equilibria may not exist. On the other hand, if bundling and slotting contracts are allowed, there can exist ine¢ cient equilibria.
To illustrate the incentive to practice bundling, consider a simple example in which …rm 1 produces two products of value 3 at zero cost, …rm 2 produces one product of value 2 and another product of value zero at zero cost and the buyer has two slots. Suppose that …rm 1 wants to sell both products. Then, under independent pricing, each product of …rm 1 faces competition from the best product of …rm 2 and hence …rm 1 realizes a total pro…t of 2. Consider now bundling. Throughout the paper, in order to determine the price of a given bundle, we …rst consider the best alternative portfolio that the buyer can build up without buying the bundle and ask how much extra value the buyer can get by improving the portfolio with the purchase of the bundle. 11 Then, without buying the bundle, the best alternative portfolio is composed of only …rm 2's products. Instead, if the buyer buys the bundle, she can replace …rm 2's products with …rm 1's products. This implies that …rm 1 can realize a total pro…t of 4. This example shows that bundling reduces competition from rival products by changing competition between individual products into competition between portfolios. More precisely, under independent pricing, each product of …rm 1 faces competition from the best product of …rm 2 but, under bundling, only one product of …rm 1 faces competition from the best product of …rm 2 and the other product of …rm 1 faces competition from the second best product of 2.
To give the intuition about e¢ ciency under bundling, consider digital goods and assume that slotting contracts are forbidden. Consider a …rm owning one product belonging to the k best among all products in the industry. Then the best alternative portfolio that the buyer can build without the product includes a product inferior to the product. Since the buyer can increase her payo¤ by replacing the inferior product with this product, the 11 More precisely, Lemma 1 shows that for any given strategy pro…les of rivals, a …rm can …nd a best response in the set of technology-renting strategies. …rm can always sell it at a strictly positive price. Therefore, all equilibria are e¢ cient. However, if …rms use slotting contracts, ine¢ cient equilibria can arise since if the buyer is bound by slotting contracts, the buyer may not be able to replace the inferior product with the superior one.
Our paper generates clear-cut policy implications (see section 8). In particular, in the case of digital goods, our results suggest that bundling or block booking is good for ef-…cient allocation of slots while slotting contracts (and hence exclusive dealing) are not socially desirable. Furthermore, we also derive policy implications with respect to foreclosure: bundling is unlikely to be a useful instrument for foreclosure (since bundling softens competition) while slotting contracts can provide a direct instrument of foreclosure.
According to the leverage theory, on which the Supreme Court's decisions to prohibit block booking were based, block booking allows a distributor to extend its monopoly power in a desirable movie to an undesirable one. This theory was criticized by Chicago School (see e.g. Bowman 1957 , Posner 1976 , Bork 1978 ) since the distributor is better o¤ by selling only the desirable movie at a higher price. As an alternative, Stigler (1968) proposed a theory based on price discrimination 12 , which became a dominant strand (Schmalensee, 1984 , McAfee et al. 1989 , Sha¤er, 1991 , Salinger 1995 and Armstrong 1996 at least until Whinston (1990) resuscitated the leverage theory with its …rst formal treatment (see, for the later work in this line, Choi-Stefanadis 2001, Carlton-Waldman 2002, and Nalebu¤ 2004). 13 Basically, in Whinston, tying allows an incumbent to commit to be aggressive, which discourages entry if there is a …xed cost of entry. On the contrary, in our paper, bundling softens competition from rival products and hence it is possible that every …rm realizes a (weakly) higher pro…t when bundling is allowed than when it is prohibited. Then, bundling is unlikely to be an instrument of foreclosure. In section 2, we review Chicago school criticism of the leverage theory and Whinston's revival of the theory and explain how we strengthen Chicago school's arguments.
We also contribute to the recent literature on bundling a large number of products. 12 However, Kenney and Klein (1983) point out that simple price discrimination explanation is inconsistent with the facts of Paramount and Loew's and argue that block booking mainly prevents exhibitors from oversearching, (i.e. from rejecting …lms revealed ex post to be of below-average value). Their hypothesis is empirically tested in a recent paper by Hanssen (2000) but the author …nds little support for the hypothesis. But Kenny and Klein (2000) do not agree with Hanseen's analysis. 13 Armstrong-Vickers (2008) is a bit related to our paper since they consider bundling in a symmetric situation: they study competition between two symmetric …rms producing two horizontally di¤erentiated products (i.e. consumers are located in a two-dimensional hotelling space). They …nd that compared to linear pricing, non-linear pricing has the bene…t of e¢ cient variable prices (i.e. marginal cost pricing) but the cost of excessive brand loyalty.
More precisely, in a framework of second-degree price discrimination, Armstrong (1999) and Bakos and Brynjolfsson (1999) show that bundling allows a monopolist to extract more surplus since it reduces the variance of average valuations by the law of large numbers. In our paper, since we assume complete information, the rent extraction issue does not arise in a monopoly setting and the law of large number plays no role. In Jeon-Menicucci (2006) , we take a framework similar to the one in the current paper to study bundling electronic academic journals; publishers owning portfolios of distinct journals compete to sell them to a library. The key di¤erence is that competition is generated by the budget constraint of the library instead of the slot constraint. In both papers, we …nd that bundling is a pro…table strategy in terms of surplus extraction. However, contrary to the current paper, Jeon-Menicucci (2006) …nd that bundling reduces social welfare since if large publishers extract more surplus with bundling, there is less (even zero) budget left for small publishers.
Our e¢ ciency result of bundling is very closely related to the …nding in literature on common agency (Bernheim and Whinston (1985 , 1986 , 1998 , O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997 Sha¤er ( , 2005 ) that shows that when multiple principals deal with a common agency, they can achieve the outcome that maximizes the payo¤s of all players. In particular, Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) study the situation when two singleproduct …rms simultaneously o¤er non-linear tari¤s together with exclusive dealing contract to a common retailer and …nd that the vertically-integrated outcome is obtained. 14 However, the papers also …nd other ine¢ cient equilibria and use either the coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim and Whinston 1986) or Pareto-dominance (Bernheim and Whinston 1998 and O'Brien and Sha¤er 1997) to select the equilibrium maximizing joint pro…ts. Our contribution is to identify a contracting space (or a condition on contracts) that makes all equilibria e¢ cient in terms of allocation of slots by distinguishing digital goods from physical goods, which allows us to make clear-cut policy implications on bundling and exclusive dealing. In addition, our paper di¤ers in its explicit consideration of competition among portfolios in the presence of slot constraint.
In what follows, section 2 reviews the Chicago School Criticism and the revival of the leverage theory with a simple model and explains our contribution. Section 3 illustrates the key results with a simple example. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 presents the main results when …rms cannot use slotting contracts. Section 6 studies the situation when …rms can use slotting contracts. Section 7 identi…es portfolio e¤ects of bundling and studies the implications on horizontal mergers. Section 8 derives policy implications on bundling and slotting contracts in terms of static e¢ ciency and foreclosure and section 9 14 O'Brien- Sha¤er (2005) show that this result also holds under simultaneous Nash bargaining for the case of N single-product …rms. concludes the paper.
Leverage Theory: Criticism and Revival
According to the leverage theory of tying (or bundling), a multiproduct …rm with monopoly power in one market can monopolize a second market using the leverage provided by its monopoly power in the …rst market. The theory was largely discredited as a result of criticisms originating in the Chicago School (see e.g. Bowman 1957 , Posner 1976 , Bork 1978 ) and then was revived by Whinston (1990) . In this section, we review both Chicago School Criticism and Whinston's revival of the leverage theory in a highly stylized model and explain our contribution with respect to them.
Chicago School Criticism
Consider two independent products (1, 2) and two sellers (A, B). A is the monopolist of product 1 and A and B compete in the market for product 2. There is a single customer, called C, who has a unit demand for each product. Assume that the cost of production is c(> 0) for all products. C's willingness to pay for product 1 is u 1 A (> c): C's willingness to pay for product 2 produced by A (B) is u 2
A , which means that once C buys product 2 from A, B cannot induce C to buy his product without making a loss. In addition, we assume u 1 A + u 2 A > u 2 B , which implies that by bundling the two products, A can force C to buy both products from A. We consider a two stage game in which A …rst decides whether or not to bundle his products and then A and B compete in prices. For simplicity, assume that in the case of bundling, A sells only the (pure) bundle.
In the absence of bundling, seller i(= A; B) simultaneously chooses a price for product j(= 1; 2) p j i 2 [c; 1). In equilibrium, A always sells product 1 at p 1 A = u 1 A and sells product 2 at p 2
Hence, A's pro…t without bundling is given by
Note that under independent pricing, the outcome is always socially e¢ cient.
Suppose now that A bundles both products and charges P A for the bundle. Then, in equilibrium, A succeeds in selling the bundle at
Note that under bundling, the outcome is socially ine¢ cient if u 2 A < u 2 B . Comparing A's pro…t without bundling with its pro…t with bundling shows that bundling does not a¤ect the pro…t if u 2 A u 2 B and decreases it otherwise. This shows that A never has the incentive to practice bundling for the purpose of monopolizing the tied product market. Furthermore, a laissez-faire policy always achieves social e¢ ciency.
However, we notice that Chicago School's criticism is a weak argument in a double sense: a social planner never has an incentive to strictly prefer bundling (since outcome is always socially e¢ cient without bundling but it can be ine¢ cient with bundling) and sellers never have any strict incentive to practice bundling (since a seller can never strictly increase its pro…t with bundling).
In our paper, we …nd a strong argument for laissez-faire regarding bundling: namely (i) the outcome of competition is e¢ cient in general under bundling but can be ine¢ cient without bundling (ii) each seller can have a strict incentive to practice bundling. In section 3, we illustrate these points with a simple example.
Revival of the Leverage Theory
The leverage theory has been revived by Whinston (1990) , who points out that the Chicago school argument hinges crucially on the assumption that the tied good market has a competitive constant returns-to-scale structure. He shows that if scale economies exist and the structure of the tied market is oligopolistic, tying can be an e¤ective strategy for a monopolist to extend monopoly power to the tied good market by inducing exit of the rival …rm(s).
To present his contribution, we modify the timing as follows: B makes an entry decision after A's bundling decision. If B decides to enter the market 2, it must pay a …xed cost
The …rst inequality means that if there was no bundling, B can successfully enter the market 2. The second inequality implies that if there was bundling, A is able to sell the bundle and realize a positive pro…t even if B enters the market. Therefore, bundling allows A to foreclose B from the market 2.
It is important to notice that in Whinston's model, bundling induces A to be aggressive. More precisely, after bundling, A can realize a positive pro…t from product 1 only if A can sell the bundle and hence A is ready to undercut B's price up to the point the price of the bundle reaches 2c. However, bundling is not pro…table once B entered the market 2. Therefore, A must be able to pre-commit to bundling.
On the contrary, we …nd that in our static model without …xed cost of entry, bundling is pro…table (and hence credible) since it allows to soften competition from rival …rms. Furthermore, we show that each …rm's pro…t is likely to be (weakly) higher when bundling is allowed than when it is prohibited and therefore bundling is unlikely to be an instrument of foreclosure.
Illustration with a simple example
We here give a simple example to illustrate some main results. There are two sellers, A and B. A has two products of value (u 1 A ; u 2 A ) = (4; 3) and B has one product of value u 1 B = 2: u j i means the value that the customer, C, obtains from the j-th best product among …rm i's products. The values of the are independent. However, each product needs to occupy a slot to generate a value and C has only two slots, which generates competition among the products. The production cost is zero for all products. We note that social e¢ ciency requires that the two slots be occupied by only A's products.
Without bundling: non-existence of equilibrium
Consider a simultaneous pricing game without bundling: seller i(= A; B) simultaneously chooses a price for product j(= 1; 2) p j i 2 R. We show below that this game has no equilibrium in pure strategy. We assume as a tie-breaking rule that if C is indi¤erent among several products, C buys the products with the highest (gross) values. 15 Without loss of generality, we can assume that A chooses prices such that 4 p 1 A max f0; 3 p 2 A g: the net surplus that C makes from buying A's best product is positive and larger than the one it makes from buying A's second best product.
First, there is no equilibrium in which A sells only its best product (i.e. there is no equilibrium with p 2 A > 1). Suppose …rst that A charges p 2 A > 3. Then, B's best response is p 1 B = 2. Hence, in the candidate equilibrium, A charges p 1 A = 4 and achieves a pro…t equal to 4. This cannot be an equilibrium since A can deviate and charge for instance p 20 A = 3 and p 10 A = 4. Then A sells both products and realizes a pro…t equal to 7. Suppose now that A charges p 2 A 2 (1; 3]. Then, B can sell its product by charging p 1
A g implies that in the candidate equilibrium, A charges p 1 A = 1 + p 2 A and hence A's pro…t is 1 + p 2 A . Consider now A's deviation in which A charges p 20 A = p 2 A " and p 10 A = p 1 A ". Then A sells both products and realizes a pro…t equal to 1 + 2(p 2 A "), which is larger than 1 + p 2 A . Second, there is no equilibrium in which A sells both products (i.e. there is no equilibrium with p 2 A 1). Note …rst that p 2
A and therefore A's pro…t cannot be larger than 3. However, A can realize a pro…t equal to 4 by choosing p 1 A = 4 and p 2 A = 1 regardless of B's strategy.
Therefore, we have a circular argument, which explains the non-existence of equilibrium. On the one hand, if A occupies only one slot, A can extract full surplus from his best product. But then, B's best response is to charge a monopoly price, which triggers A's deviation to occupy both slots. On the other hand, if A occupies both slots, each of A's product faces competition from B's product such that A's total pro…t is lower than the pro…t from selling only the best product.
Bundling
Consider now that A sells only a bundle of both products and charges a price P A 2 R. For notational consistency, let P B 2 R denote the price that B charges for its product. Consider the simultaneous pricing game. Then, the unique equilibrium is P A = 5 and P B = 0. In the equilibrium, C buys A's bundle and hence the outcome is socially e¢ cient. It is easy to see why this is an equilibrium. A has no incentive to charge a higher price; then C prefers buying B's product instead of A's bundle. Given that B's pro…t is zero, P B = 0 is a best response.
Although the example is simple, it generates useful insights. First, it shows that each …rm has an incentive to use bundling since bundling reduces competition from rival …rms' products. To explain this, suppose that A wants to occupy both slots. Under independent pricing, each of A's product faces competition from B's product and hence A obtains a pro…t of 3. However, under bundling, A obtains a pro…t of 5, which is the di¤erence between the value C obtains with the bundle and the maximum value C can obtain without the bundle. Under bundling, it is as if only one product of A faces competition from B's product and the other product of A does not face any competition.
The intuition for why bundling restores e¢ ciency is that under competition among bundles, every seller having a superior product can make a positive pro…t by inducing C to replace an inferior product with the superior one. As an illustration, consider the following example (u 1 A ; u 2 A ) = (4; 2) and u 1 B = 3. In this example either, equilibrium in pure strategy does not exist under independent pricing. However, under bundling, there is a unique equilibrium in pure strategy: P A = 4 and P B = 1, which is e¢ cient. Contrary to the leverage theory, even though C buys A's bundle, B can realize a pro…t by inducing C to replace A's second product with B's one.
The Model

The setting
There are n …rms (or sellers), denoted by i = 1; :::; n, and a buyer; we use "he" for each …rm and "she" for the buyer; we also use i = 0 to represent the buyer. Each …rm i (> 0) has a portfolio of n i distinct products. We use ij to denote …rm i's j-th best product (for instance, 12 represents …rm 1's 2nd best product) and B i = fi1; :::; in i g represents i's portfolio of products; let B B 1 [ ::: [ B n . The buyer has a unit demand for each product and has k ( 1) number of slots. A product needs to occupy a slot to generate a value. 16 Let u j i be the value that the buyer obtains from allocating a slot to product ij; thus u 1 i u 2 i ::: u n i i > 0 for i = 1; :::; n. We assume that the values are independent: we show at the end of Section 5 that our results hold for substitutes as well. In the case in which n i k, it is straightforward that only the k best products of …rm i matter in our setting. In the case of n i < k, we de…ne u n i +1 i = ::: = u k i = 0. In this way we can think, without loss of generality, that each …rm's portfolio consists of k products. Even though we consider one buyer, our model can be applied in a straightforward way to a situation with multiple buyers if each buyer operates in a separate market and each seller can price-discriminate the buyers. We assume that a prototype of each product is already produced and the cost of (re)production is c 0 for every product ij 2 B 17 ; if c = 0 (c > 0), the products are called digital goods (physical goods). Assume for simplicity that no cost is incurred by the buyer. 18 The buyer's payo¤ is given by the sum of the values obtained from the purchased products minus the prices paid.
Let u j denote the value that the buyer obtains from the j-th best product among all products in B; thus u 1 u 2 ::: u nk . We assume u k > maxfc; u k+1 g; hence, the set of the k best products, denoted with B F B , is unique and it is socially optimal to occupy all slots with the products in B F B . For any B B, let U (B) represent the total value that the buyer obtains from allocating k slots to the best k products in B: obviously, if B has less than k number of products, the total value is computed by allocating one slot to each product. In particular, we de…ne U U (B F B ) = u 1 +:: 16 By assuming unit demand, we assume for simplicity that a product can occupy at most one slot in that the value generated from occupying a second slot is zero. This assumption can be relaxed without changing the main results. 17 The assumption of homogeneous cost is made without loss of generality: at the end of Section 5 we
show that the results are (qualitatively) una¤ected if this assumption is relaxed. 18 If instead the buyer bears cost j i 0 to generate a value from product ij, then we can consider u j i j i as the buyer's gross value and the following analysis applies.
Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists n F B between 1 and n such that
In this setup, we study how bundling a¤ects the set of products occupying the buyer's slots. Precisely, we are interested in knowing when the slots are occupied by the products in B F B . We say that an equilibrium is (socially) e¢ cient if all slots are allocated to the products in B F B : then the …rst-best outcome is realized, which is the reason why use the superscript F B.
Contracts and game
In this section, we …rst describe the bilateral contracts that seller i can propose to the buyer in our model and then introduce the timing of the game that we study.
Bundling without slotting contracts
Menu of bundles 19 In the absence of slotting contracts (that will be de…ned later on), the most general contract between seller i and the buyer is that …rm i o¤ers a menu of bundles with prices
Then, if the buyer buys bundle B 1 from …rm 1, .., bundle B n from …rm n (some of these sets may be empty), 20 then she pays P 1 (B 1 ) + ::: + P n (B n ). Let s i = fP i (B i )g B i B i denote a generic strategy of …rm i and S i be the strategy space for …rm i. 21 Independent pricing plus a …xed fee A particular class of menu of bundles is the strategy which is composed of individual prices (p i1 ; :::; p ik ) and a …xed fee
In this case, if the buyer wants to buy at least one product from …rm i, she must …rst pay F i for the right to buy, and then she pays the individual prices of the 19 Our de…nition of menu of bundles generalizes the notion of mixed bundling used in the context of two goods. In this case, mixed bundling means that the seller charges a price for each good and another price for the bundle of both goods. 20 In what follows, we simply write that the buyer buys B 1 [ ::: [ B n . 21 In fact, for some s i 2 S i , the buyer may want to buy more than one bundle from …rm i (for instance, if buying two small bundles is cheaper than buying a big bundle composed of the two small ones). However, none of our arguments or proofs below depends on the assumption that the buyer buys at most one bundle from each …rm. Thus, for the sake of simple notation, we make this assumption in the rest of the paper.
products that she selects to buy. Let IF i S i be the set of "independent pricing plus a …xed fee" strategies and let if i 2 IF i an element of the set. Three particular cases of "independent pricing plus a …xed fee"strategies are of great interest:
Independent pricing: Independent pricing is an extreme case with F i = 0, thus
In other words, pure bundling is a deal of all-ornothing.
Technology-renting: A technology renting strategy consists of two elements: …rm i rents its production technology to the buyer by charging p ij = c for each ij 2 B i , and extracts the buyer's surplus by levying a …xed rental fee F i . Let T R i IF i be the set of technology-renting strategies, and tr i 2 T R i an element of the set.
Bundling with slotting contracts
In what follows, we will distinguish two cases depending on whether slotting contracts are used or not. If …rm i does not use any slotting contract, the buyer has full freedom in allocating the slots among all products she purchased. In contrast, if the buyer buys from …rm i a bundle B i with a slotting contract (and q i = #B i is the number of products in B i ), the buyer must allocate q i number of slots to the products in B i .
Exclusive dealing
Exclusive dealing corresponds to the case in which …rm i o¤ers only a bundle composed of k products with a slotting contract.
Note that under individual pricing, slotting contracts are redundant since the buyer will not buy any product that will not occupy a slot. In section 5 we study competition among bundles without slotting contracts, and in section 6 we allow for slotting contracts.
Timing
In sections 5 and 6, we consider a two-stage simultaneous pricing game in which at stage one, each …rm i simultaneously makes a contract o¤er; at stage two, the buyer decides the bundles (or products) to buy and allocates the slots.
At stage two, as a tie-breaking rule, we assume that in case the buyer is indi¤erent among di¤erent combinations of products, she chooses the combination that maximizes her (gross) value. 22 
Bundling without slotting contracts
In this section, we study competition among sellers when bundling is allowed but slotting contracts are prohibited. In section 5.1, we …rst show that each …rm has an incentive to practice bundling. In section 5.2, we describe an e¢ cient Nash equilibrium (NE) for any c 0. Section 5.3 shows that any NE is e¢ cient if c is small and identi…es a su¢ cient condition to make all equilibria e¢ cient for any c. Section 5.4 gives results on pro…ts. Section 5.5 performs robustness checks by introducing heterogeneous costs or substitutions.
Incentive to bundle
We …rst describe an important property of the technology-renting strategies in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 For any pro…le (s i ; s i ), let i 0 denote the pro…t of …rm i given (s i ; s i ). Then, …rm i can make pro…t i also by playing a technology-renting strategy tr i 2 T R i instead of s i such that the …xed fee F i associated with tr i is equal to i .
Proof. See Appendix.
Lemma 1 says that no …rm i loses anything by restricting attention to strategies in T R i regardless of the strategies used by other …rms. We will use often this result in the proofs of our propositions. The lemma also suggests that each …rm has at least a weak incentive to practice bundling. We now provide an example to illustrate a case in which a …rm, without bundling, cannot achieve the pro…t that he can achieve with a technology renting strategy.
Example 1 Assume n = 2; c = 0; k = 3. Firm 1 has three products with value (5; 3; 0) and …rm 2 has three products with value (4; 1:9; 1). Suppose that …rm 2 uses a technologyrenting strategy and charges F 2 = 4. Then, from Lemma 1, one of …rm 1's best responses is to use a technology-renting strategy and to charge F 1 = 5:1. Instead, if …rm 1 switches to independent pricing, each of his two best products faces the competition from product 22, and the best …rm 1 can do is to sell 11 and 12 at prices 3.1 and 1.1 respectively, with a pro…t of 4.2 which is inferior to 5:1:
The reason why independent pricing gives a smaller pro…t than a technology-renting strategy in the above example is the following. Under independent pricing, each product of …rm 1 faces competition from …rm 2's second-best product, which does not occupy any slot. This is because, under independent pricing, the buyer has the option of buying (and paying) only one product from …rm 1, and thus the …rm cannot induce the buyer to buy both 11 and 12 if he charges prices higher than 5 1:9 and 3 1:9, respectively. In contrast, under bundling (or technology-renting), such an option does not exist: without paying the …xed fee, no product of …rm 1 is available while after paying the …xed fee, the buyer gets both products of …rm 1 at the same time (even though the buyer can use only one of them in this case, it does not allow her to save any payment). Therefore, under bundling, the two products of …rm 1 compete with the second-best and the third-best products of …rm 2, which allows …rm 1 to realize a higher pro…t: 5:1 is derived from 5 + 3 1:9 1. In other words, bundling allows …rm 1 to reduce competition from rival products.
Lemma 1 and Example 1 together imply Proposition 1 (incentive to bundle) Each …rm has at least a weak and sometimes a strict incentive to practice bundling instead of independent pricing.
An e¢ cient equilibrium
In this section, we show that an e¢ cient equilibrium exists for any c 0; in this equilibrium each …rm i uses a technology-renting strategy, and thus we can think from Lemma 1 that the strategy space for each …rm i is given by the set of possible values of F i in [0; +1). Let B i represent the set [ h6 =i B h of products in the portfolios of …rms di¤erent from i, where i represents all …rms except …rm i. In order to understand the equilibrium value of F i , we need to know the best alternative portfolio of products that the buyer can build up to occupy the slots when she does not buy any product from …rm i (for i = 1; :::; n F B ). More precisely, we suppose that the buyer has already rented the technologies of all other …rms, and is considering whether to rent also the technology of …rm i; thus we can view i as the marginal seller. In this context we determine the highest F i …rm i can charge to induce the buyer to rent i's technology.
For this purpose, let u j i represent the value of the j-th best product among the products in B i . For instance, if c = 0 the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does not buy any product from i is made by the products with values (u 1 i ; :::; u k i ). However, if c > 0, u q i < c may occur for some q k. Then, the best alternative portfolio is composed of less than k number of products since the buyer will not buy any product with value smaller than c. We below describe the best alternative portfolio for any c.
Let
denote the set of the …rst best products in B i . Obviously, B F B i will be included in the best alternative portfolio since every product in B F B has a value larger than c. Note also that B F B i includes exactly k q F B i number of products. Now let B SB i represent the subset of the best products in B i nB F B i such that the value of each product in B SB i is not smaller than c and the cardinality of B SB i , denoted by q SB i , is not larger than q F B i . Therefore q SB i is the number in f0; :::; q F B i g with the following property:
From the de…nition of B SB i , when the buyer does not buy anything from i, the best alternative portfolio is given by B is the total (gross) value from B SB i . Let tr i denote the technology renting strategy of …rm i in the equilibrium we are describing. Then, the …xed fee associated with tr i , denoted by F i , is given by:
for i = n F B + 1; :::; n:
(1)
The fee F i is equal to the di¤erence between the total value of the best portfolio (net of the cost of producing it) and the total value of the best alternative portfolio (net of the cost of producing it). For instance, in the case of Digital goods (i.e., c = 0), F i is simply equal to U U i = U F B i U SB i . More precisely, when i chooses F i = F i , i supposes that all the other production technologies are rented already to the buyer (and thus all products in B i are already available to the buyer at cost) and his production technology is the marginal (i.e. the last) one that the buyer considers about renting. Under this assumption, F i is set to make the buyer indi¤erent between renting i's technology or not. On the one hand, without renting i's technology, the net value that the buyer obtains from the best alternative portfolio is
On the other hand, if the buyer rents i's technology, she obtains a net value from the best portfolio equal to U ck P h6 =i F h F i . Then F i is set equal to F i in order to make the two payo¤s equal, which induces the buyer to buy B F B i , while a value of F i higher than F i would induce the buyer not to rent i's technology, which justi…es i's presumption that his technology is the marginal one. Hence, if each …rm i sets F i = F i , the buyer buys all products in B F B and the outcome is e¢ cient.
The next proposition establishes that the pro…le (tr 1 ; :::; tr n ) is a Nash equilibrium: We call this equilibrium the technology-renting equilibrium.
Proposition 2 (technology-renting equilibrium) For any c 0, there exists a NE in which each …rm i uses the technology-renting strategy tr i and this equilibrium is e¢ cient. In this NE, …rm i's pro…t is F i for i = 1; :::; n, while the buyer's payo¤ is
Proof. See Appendix for the proof. We here provide a sketch of the proof. We …rst show that given (tr 1 ; :::; tr n ), the buyer buys B F B i for i = 1; :::; n F B . And then we prove that there is no pro…table deviation for any …rm. To check the deviation, from Lemma 1, it is enough to consider …rm i's deviation in the set T R i of technology-renting strategies. Obviously, …rm i has no incentive to decrease F i below F i ; …rm i has no incentive to increase F i above F i since we show that then the buyer will not buy any product from …rm i.
Our technology-renting equilibrium to some extent generalizes the marginal cost pricing result in the literature on competition in non-linear pricing (Armstrong-Vickers, 2001, 2008 and Rochet-Stole 2002) to a situation in which each …rm can produce any number of products. In the technology-renting equilibrium, the buyer builds up the …rst best portfolio B F B and …lls the slots with it. This generates a social surplus equal to U ck which is split among the …rms and the buyer as follows: …rm i's pro…t is F i for i = 1; :::; n, and the buyer's payo¤ is
. Furthermore, F i can be interpreted in terms of the payment received by the seller in the pivotal Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism. If q F B i = 0, seller i is not pivotal and hence his payment is zero (i.e. F i = 0). If q F B i > 0, seller i is pivotal. In his absence, the sum of utilities of all other players is U i c(k q F B i + q SB i ). In his presence, the sum of utilities of all other players is U c 
E¢ ciency
In this subsection, we …rst illustrate a case in which an ine¢ cient equilibrium arises for c > 0 because of pure bundling. And then we show that all equilibria are e¢ cient for c small enough and that the same result holds for any c if …rms are restricted to marginal prices which are not smaller than c.
An ine¢ cient equilibrium
The game we are considering may have many NE di¤erent from (tr 1 ; :::; tr n ), and some of them can be ine¢ cient as the following example illustrates.
Example 3 (pure bundling and ine¢ ciency) Consider the setting of Example 2: k = 2, n = 2, c = 3 and (u 1 1 ; u 2 1 ) = (12; 8); (u 1 2 ; u 2 2 ) = (10; 5) In the following NE, each …rm i plays a pure bundling strategy and the buyer buys f11; 12g rather than B F B = f11; 21g: s 1 2 S 1 is such that F 1 = 11, p 11 = p 12 = 0; s 2 2 S 2 is such that F 2 = 6, p 21 = p 22 = 0:
In the above example, given (s 1 ; s 2 ), the buyer buys B 1 and gets a payo¤ of 9. Under pure bundling, …rm 1 induces the buyer to buy product 12 even though this product does not belong to B F B , and …rm 2 is unable to sell the superior product 21 for the two following reasons. First, from the all-or-nothing deal, given that the buyer buys 11, her marginal cost of getting product 12 is p 12 = 0. Second, in order not to make a loss, …rm 2 must charge a price for 21 at least equal to c = 3 while the buyer's gain from replacing 12 with 21 is 2.
E¢ ciency for c small
The previous reasoning regarding example 3 also suggests that the result may be di¤erent (i.e. the ine¢ cient equilibrium may disappear) if c were smaller than 2, as this makes 10 c larger than 8 and therefore …rm 2 could induce the buyer to replace 12 with 21 and make a positive pro…t. Indeed, we can prove that if c < u k u k+1 then in any NE the buyer buys B F B . This makes the issue of multiplicity not very serious from the point of view of social welfare.
Proposition 3 (e¢ ciency) All Nash equilibria are e¢ cient (i.e., in any NE, the buyer buys the set B F B ) if c < u k u k+1 .
Proposition 3 holds because of the argument made above with reference to Example 3. Suppose a pro…le of strategies (s 1 ; :::; s n ) induces the buyer to buy B = B 1 [ ::: [ B n such that product ij belongs to B F B but not to B, while product i 0 j 0 belongs to B and not to B F B . Then …rm i can induce the buyer to buy ij for an extra outlay of c + " and to give ij the slot previously assigned to i 0 j 0 , since the buyer increases her pro…t by u j i c " u j 0 i 0 , and u j i u j 0 i 0 > c because u k u k+1 > c. Notice that this argument does not require that the buyer stop buying product i 0 j 0 , since P i 0 (B i 0 nfi 0 j 0 g) may be larger than P i 0 (B i 0 ). 23 Next, we give a simple corollary of Proposition 3:
Corollary 1 In the case of digital goods (that is, c = 0), all equilibria are e¢ cient and therefore a policy of laissez-faire regarding bundling achieves e¢ ciency.
Although the corollary is an obvious consequence of Proposition 3, it has an important policy implication. The example in Section 3 considers the case of digital goods and shows that when bundling is prohibited, an equilibrium in pure strategies fails to exist and hence the outcome of competition is not e¢ cient. In contrast, when bundling is allowed, the corollary says that all equilibria are e¢ cient and Proposition 2 says that at least one equilibrium exists. In addition, we know from proposition 1 that each …rm does have an incentive to practice bundling. Therefore, we can conclude that in the case of digital goods, a policy of laissez-faire achieves e¢ ciency.
Achieving e¢ ciency for c not small
Example 3 shows that ine¢ cient equilibria can exist for c large. In this section, we show that e¢ ciency holds in any equilibrium if …rms are prohibited from setting the marginal price 24 of any product below its cost c: Precisely, we consider the following restriction for …rm i's strategies:
(2) 23 We are using the free disposal assumption, which makes sense in this section where there is no slotting contract. In the next section where the buyer can sign slotting contracts, free disposal is still assumed as long as it does not violate the slotting contracts signed by the buyer. 24 By the marginal price we mean the increase in the price of a bundle when an additional product is added to the bundle.
The meaning of (2) is that as the number of objects in a bundle of …rm i increases, the price of the bundle needs to increase at least by the cost of the additional products in the bundle. As a consequence, if …rm i is interested in selling a particular bundle B i for a certain price P , condition (2) forces him to make each subset of B i available at a price strictly (weakly) smaller than P if c > 0 (if c = 0) such that the buyer can save at least c by cancelling a product within B i . In particular, the condition makes it impossible for a …rm to use the pure bundling strategy (i.e. to propose only a single bundle by charging only a …xed fee) for c > 0. Note that an "independent pricing plus …xed fee" strategy satis…es (2) if and only if p ij c for any ij (i.e. each individual price is larger than the cost) and in particular every technology-renting strategy satis…es (2) . Thus, from Lemma 1 we know that …rm i can always …nd a best response to any s i in the set of strategies satisfying (2) . Under the restriction (2), we can show that for any c, all the NE are e¢ cient. 25 Proposition 4 (e¢ ciency) Suppose that each …rm must satisfy (2) . Then, all equilibria are e¢ cient for any c 0.
The intuition for the e¢ ciency result of Proposition 4 is somewhat linked to the intuition for Proposition 3. Suppose that a pro…le of strategies (s 1 ; :::; s n ) induces the buyer to buy B = B 1 [ ::: [ B n such that product ij belongs to B F B but not to B while product i 0 j 0 belongs to B and not to B F B . When (2) holds, …rm i can increase his pro…t by inducing the buyer to replace i 0 j 0 with ij (with the latter product priced marginally at c + ") because cancelling i 0 j 0 allows the buyer to save at least c, and thus the buyer earns at least u j i (c + ") (u j 0 i 0 c) > 0 from replacing i 0 j 0 with ij.
Remark 1:
In the practice of competition policy, …rms' charging prices below cost have been discussed in the context of predation: Areeda and Turner (1975) were the …rst to propose to use pricing below costs to identify predation. Our model does not deal with predation but interestingly Proposition 4 shows that prohibiting …rms from charging individual prices (or marginal prices) below costs makes all equilibria e¢ cient in our static pricing game.
Pro…ts
In this subsection, we study the sellers'payo¤s under bundling and then study how bundling a¤ects pro…ts. For the …rst part, we have:
Proposition 5 (pro…ts) (i) In the case of digital goods, in any equilibrium, …rm i realizes at least a pro…t of F i . (ii) When n = 2, in any NE the pro…t of …rm i is not larger than F i , the pro…t in the technology-renting equilibrium, for i = 1; 2.
(iii) When n = 2 and each …rm must satisfy (2) , in any NE the pro…t of …rm i is equal to F i , for i = 1; 2.
Proposition 5(i) is straightforward since when c = 0, in the worst case in which the buyer has bought all the other products, …rm i can realize a pro…t of F i . The intuition for proposition 5(ii) is that when n = 2, F 1 makes the buyer indi¤erent between buying B F B 1 from 1 (at the marginal price cq F B 1 ), and buying B SB 1 from 2 (at the marginal price cq SB 1 ). Then, if 1 attempts to make a pro…t larger than F 1 , 2 can increase his pro…t by inducing the buyer to buy B SB 1 at a price a bit higher than cq SB 1 . Furthermore, when each …rm is required to charge a marginal price larger than or equal to c, we can pin down the equilibrium pro…t of each …rm and show that it is equal to F i .
Proposition 5 implies
Corollary 2 Suppose n = 2.
(i) The technology-renting equilibrium Pareto dominates any other equilibrium in terms of sellers'payo¤s.
(ii) In the case of digital goods or when each …rm must satisfy (2) , in all equilibria, the outcome is identical to that of the technology-renting equilibrium (in terms of allocation of slots and each player's payo¤ ).
Not surprisingly, each seller's pro…t is lower in the ine¢ cient equilibrium of example 3 than in the technology-renting equilibrium of example 2.
Remark 2: Corollary 2(i) is similar to the …nding of Bernheim and Whinston (1998) and O'Brien and Sha¤er (1997) that Pareto undominated equilibria maximize the joint payo¤s of all sellers and the (single) buyer.
Remark 3: For n > 2, it is more di¢ cult to pin down each …rm's equilibrium pro…t. When all …rms are required to satisfy (2), we can show that …rm i can realize at least a pro…t equal to F i (in fact, this is proven in the proof of Proposition 5(iii) for an arbitrary n 2); but we have been unable to establish that F i is also an upper bound for the pro…t of …rm i.
We now study how bundling a¤ects pro…ts. Proof. If an e¢ cient equilibrium exists under independent pricing, we must have
Therefore, for i n F B , the upper bound on his pro…t is given by
From (1) 
Robustness
In this subsection, we perform two robustness checks.
The case of heterogenous costs
We can show that our notation can be modi…ed to extend all the previous results in this section to the case in which production costs are heterogenous, that is the production cost of …rm i for product ij is c j i 0. For this purpose, we de…ne v j i = u j i c j i as the value of product ij net of production cost and order products according to their net values such that products. Now let B SB i represent the subset of the best products in B i nB F B i such that the net value of each product in B SB i is not smaller than 0 and the cardinality of B SB i , denoted by q SB i , is not larger than q F B i . Therefore q SB i is the number in f0; :::; q F B i g with the following property:
A technology renting strategy for …rm i is de…ned as p ij = c j i for j = 1; :::; k together with F i , and Lemma 1 holds. Proposition 2 holds with
i and Proposition 4 holds under the restriction
The case of substitutes
In this subsection we consider substitution among products. Since it is hard to describe all possible substitutions for every possible subset of B, we consider a simple case of substitution and show that our results are robust. Precisely, we assume that if the buyer buys the set of products B B with q = #(B), then there is a number s > 0 such that her gross utility from the products in B is given by U (B) (q 1)s. With this subadditive utility function we represent a negative synergy which has a constant magnitude as the number of products used by the buyer increases.
Our previous results in this section hold to this setting provided that we replace u j i with u j i u j i s for each i and j. Indeed, letŨ (B) be de…ned as U (B) in whichũ j i replaces u j i . Then it is simple to see that U (B) (q 1)s =Ũ (B) + s. In other words, the buyer's gross utility from bundle B is given byŨ (B), except for the constant s. Then everything happens as if the value of each product has been reduced by s, and thus the technology renting equilibrium still exists, albeit with di¤erent …xed fees. As a general result we …nd that both the …rms and the buyer make (weakly) lower pro…ts in this equilibrium than when s = 0; the driving force for this result is that the social value which is generated by trade is lower because of the substitution. In particular, the buyer's pro…t is strictly reduced unless she made a zero pro…t (i.e., 0 = 0) when s = 0. The pro…t of each …rm i = 1; :::; n F B is also reduced, unless q F B i = q SB i and u k i s c. Finally, the results about e¢ cient equilibria are unchanged by the negative synergy.
Bundling with slotting contracts
In this section we study a setting in which each …rm i can use slotting contracts. When …rm i uses slotting contracts, buying a bundle B i requires the buyer to allocate slots to all products in B i ; therefore, if all …rms use slotting contracts, the buyer can buy B 1 [ ::: [ B n only if #(B 1 [ ::: [ B n ) k. By using slotting contracts, it may be possible (and pro…table) for …rm i to induce the buyer to buy a bundle bigger than B F B i , in order to make sales of the rival …rms di¢ cult. In extreme cases, i may succeed in occupying all slots with his own products by setting P i (B i ) very high for each B i 6 = B i and choosing P i (B i ) to induce the buyer to buy B i , as it occurs in the following example.
Example 4 (slotting contracts and ine¢ ciency) Suppose that n = 2, k = 3, c = 0, and (u 1 1 ; u 2 1 ; u 3 1 ) = (10; 7; 6); (u 1 2 ; u 2 2 ; u 3 2 ) = (9; 8; 1)
Here B F B = f11; 21; 22g, so that q F B 1 = 1 and q F B 2 = 2. However, there exists an ine¢ cient NE in which P i (B i ) is high enough for each B i 6 = B i , for i = 1; 2, and P 1 (B 1 ) = 5, P 2 (B 2 ) = 0. In words, each …rm i o¤ers only B i through a slotting contract, and Bertrand competition between B 1 and B 2 determines the above prices. In this NE, …rm 1 occupies the three slots even though products 21 and 22 are both better than 12 and 13.
This example shows that even in the case of digital goods, ine¢ cient equilibria exist when …rms can use slotting contracts; this contrasts with Proposition 3, which shows that e¢ ciency is always achieved for small values of c without slotting contracts. The reason for why such a result does not hold with slotting contracts is that a …rm i with a product ij 2 B F B may not be able to induce the buyer to modify her portfolio by replacing an inferior product of a rival …rm with product ij, even though …rm i charges a very small price, in case the rival …rm uses a slotting contract. Indeed, all three products of …rm 1 are bounded with the slotting contract such that replacing for instance product 13 with product 21 implies that the buyer cannot use any product of …rm 1, which the buyer cannot a¤ord. On the contrary, without slotting contracts, after buying B 1 , the buyer can freely dispose of any product in B 1 to replace it with a superior product.
In spite of Example 4, we can show that Lemma 1 holds and the technology-renting equilibrium described by Proposition 2 is a NE also under slotting contracts and thus an e¢ cient NE always exists in this setting. Furthermore, also Propositions 4 and 5 hold in this environment.
Corollary 3 Regardless of whether each …rm uses slotting contracts or not (hence, this setting includes the extreme case in which all …rms use slotting contracts), (i) a …rm can …nd a best response among technology-renting strategy without using slotting contracts (ii) there exists a technology-renting equilibrium; the pro…le (tr 1 ; :::; tr n ) described in (1) is a NE for any c 0;
(iii) every NE is e¢ cient under condition (2); (iv) if n = 2, the technology-renting equilibrium Pareto dominates any other NE.
Proof. For the proof of (i) we can follow the proof of Lemma 1 to show that -given a pro…le of strategies of other …rms -…rm i does not lose anything from using a suitable technology renting strategy without the clause of slotting contracts. For the proof of (ii)-(iv), we notice that in the proofs of Proposition 2, 4 and 5(i) we never use the possibility that the buyer does not allocate a slot to a product she has purchased. In other words, in the equilibria of Proposition 2, 4 and 5(i), the buyer buys only the products that she will use. This di¤ers from the proof of Proposition 3, which indeed does not apply under slotting contracts, as Example 4 proves. Corollary 3(iii) suggests that if …rms are prohibited from charging marginal prices below costs, all equilibria are e¢ cient regardless of whether they can use slotting contracts. This result is not surprising since, as we said in subsection 5.3.3, condition (2) makes pure bundling impossible and, when a …rm o¤ers a bundle, forces each …rm to o¤er a complete subset of the bundle as well. 26 This in turn allows to be able to buy only the products that would occupy a slot and makes slotting contracts redundant.
Although corollary 3(iv) holds for duopoly, the following example shows that there can be a Pareto undominated ine¢ cient equilibrium if there are more than two …rms.
Example 5 (slotting contracts and Pareto undominated ine¢ cient equilibria). Suppose that n = 3, k = 3, c = 0, and (u 1 1 ; u 2 1 ; u 3 1 ) = (10; 7; 6); (u 1 2 ; u 2 2 ; u 3 2 ) = (u 1 3 ; u 2 3 ; u 3 3 ) = (9; 8; 1)
Here B F B = f11; 21; 31g and q F B 1 = 1, F 1 = 2. However, there exists an ine¢ cient equilibrium in which each …rm i proposes only the bundle B i of all his products and uses the slotting contract. Prices are P 1 (B 1 ) = 5, P 2 (B 2 ) = 0, P 3 (B 3 ) = 0. In this equilibrium, …rm 1 occupies all slots and his pro…t is 5 (> F 1 ).
Portfolio e¤ects of Bundling
In this section, we identify portfolio e¤ects of bundling and analyze the consequences on a horizontal merger. For this purpose, we focus our discussion on the technology-renting equilibrium in which each seller i makes a pro…t of F i .
Portfolio e¤ects
By portfolio e¤ects of bundling, we mean that under bundling, two …rms who end up selling products with the same values can make di¤erent pro…ts. Consider the digital good for simplicity and suppose that …rms 1 and 2 are such that q F B 
In addition, if B SB 1 \ B 2 6 = then U SB 1 < U SB 2 and thus F 1 > F 2 : the buyer ends up purchasing products of identical values from both …rms but pays a higher price to …rm 1. This is because in equilibrium each …rm i extracts with F i the surplus that the buyer obtains by replacing the products belonging to B SB i with the products belonging to B F B i . For instance, in the case of digital goods, in the technology-renting equilibrium, we have
In the equation, U is the same for all …rms while U i is smaller for …rms with better portfolio. In contrast, in the case of independent pricing, there is no such portfolio e¤ect; if an equilibrium (in pure strategy) exists under independent pricing, all products of identical value must be sold at the same prices. 
Portfolio e¤ects and horizontal merger
A natural and important consequence of the portfolio e¤ects is that it creates incentives for a horizontal merger. We will …rst consider a merger between two given …rms and then endogeneize the merger.
Consider the merger of any two …rms i and h (with i 6 = h) and let the two …rms after the merger be denoted by i + h. Social welfare is not a¤ected by the merger since the buyer buys the products in B F B regardless of the market structure of the sellers. The pro…t of a …rm i 0 di¤erent from i and h is not a¤ected by the merger since the pro…t of i 0 is the di¤erence between the value of the best portfolio B F B and the value of the best alternative portfolio B F B i 0 [ B SB i 0 that the buyer can build up without buying any product from …rm i 0 . Since the composition of both B F B i 0 and B SB i 0 is not a¤ected by the merger, the merger does not change the pro…t of any third …rm.
The merger is pro…table since it weakens the best alternative portfolio. Before the merger, if the buyer does not buy any product from i, the best alternative portfolio includes products from h. In contrast, after the merger, the best alternative portfolio does not include products from h, which implies that the merger allows …rm i to command a higher price. The same logic applies to …rm h as well.
The conditions in the proposition under which the merger does not increase the pro…ts of the merging …rms are very stringent. For instance, when q F B 
In this case, i + j faces as …erce competition as i and h face separately, and the pro…ts of i; h and i + h are respectively
. We now endogenize the merger in the following way. Suppose that a given …rm h sells a product in his portfolio with value u > c for some exogenous reasons. We determine the value each …rm i(6 = h) attaches to acquiring this product. From proposition 7, as any merger does not a¤ect a third …rm's pro…t, if a …rm di¤erent from …rm i buys the product, then …rm i's pro…t is unchanged with respect to the pro…t before the sale. If instead …rm i buys the product, then his pro…t increases only when the product belongs to B F B i [B SB i : in this case, the pro…t of i increases by u maxfu k+1 i ; cg. For instance, if u k+1 i c, i's purchase of h's product will modify the best alternative portfolio that the buyer can build up when she does not buy any product from i such that in the portfolio, the product bought from h is replaced by a product with value u k+1 i and hence i can increase his pro…t by u u k+1 i : If u k+1 i < c, the product bought from h simply disappears in the best alternative portfolio and therefore i's pro…t increases by u c.
If we assume that …rm h uses a second price auction, we get the following result. 
otherwise.
(ii) If there is a …rm (say …rm 1) whose portfolio dominates each other …rm's one in the sense that q F B and for i = 2; :::; n, then b 1 b i for i = 2; :::; n. Therefore, there is a tendency of increasing concentration.
Proof. We only need to prove (ii). For this, we prove that u k+1 Proposition 8(ii) suggests that there is a tendency of increasing concentration since the dominating …rm has a higher willingness to pay for the product in auction. In order to give the intuition, we suppose h 6 = 1 and h 6 = 2 and compare 1's bid with 2's bid. Note that from the de…nition of the dominance, the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does not buy any product from 1 is worse than the one when the buyer does not buy anything from 2. Therefore, only two cases may arise: either h's product on sale belongs to both portfolios or it belongs only to the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does not buy anything from 1. In the second case, it is clear that 1 makes a positive bid while 2 makes zero bid. In the …rst case, we need to think which product is going to replace h's product in the best alternative portfolio. Since the best alternative portfolio when the buyer does not buy anything from 1 is inferior to the one when the buyer does not buy anything from 2, the product replacing h's product is worse in the …rst portfolio than in the second. This implies that 1 gains more than 2 from purchasing the product of …rm h.
Remark 4: Our proposition 7 is similar to the results that O'Brien and Sha¤er …nd (Propositions 4-6) when they study a horizontal merger in a Nash bargaining setup; but they do not endogeneize the merger as we do in Proposition 8.
Policy implications
In this section, we derive policy implications from our …ndings.
E¢ cient allocation of slots
When we consider a static setting and focus on e¢ cient allocation of slots, our results generate the following policy implications. First, bundling such as o¤ering a menu of bundles or "individual prices plus a …xed fee" is socially desirable and should be allowed. Second, regarding pure bundling, in the case of digital goods, the technology-renting strategy is identical to pure bundling and therefore pure bundling of all products belonging to a …rm achieves e¢ cient allocation and is socially desirable. In contrast, in the case of physical goods, pure bundling can create ine¢ cient equilibria and hence competition authority should be careful. Third, regarding slotting contracts, in the case of digital goods, our analysis implies that prohibiting slotting contracts is socially desirable since then all equilibria are e¢ cient. In contrast, in the case of physical goods, ine¢ cient equilibria can arise either because of charging marginal prices below costs (in the absence of slotting contracts) or because of slotting contracts. Although we have shown that prohibiting …rms from charging marginal prices below costs makes all equilibria e¢ cient, in practice, it would be di¢ cult to monitor whether …rms charge marginal prices below costs (De la Mano-Durand, 2005). Then, prohibiting only slotting contracts may not be enough to achieve e¢ cient allocations.
Foreclosure
Even though we have not formally investigated the issue of foreclosure, our results have some implications on how bundling and slotting contracts a¤ect foreclosure.
Consider …rst bundling. As we noted in section 2.2, in Whinston (1990) 's revival of the leverage theory, bundling serves as a commitment device to be aggressive and therefore can allow to foreclose a rival …rm. On the contrary, in our paper, bundling allows a …rm to extract more surplus from the buyer by softening competition from rival products. For instance, in the case of digital goods, if the equilibrium under individual pricing is e¢ cient, proposition 6 and 5(i) suggest that all …rms'pro…ts are at least weakly higher (and strictly so for those who occupy at least two slots) in any equilibrium under bundling than in the equilibrium under individual pricing. Then bundling cannot serve as an instrument of foreclosure.
This opposite prediction is due to a key di¤erence between Whinston's model and our model. Whinston considers a situation in which, the tying product and the tied product do not compete and therefore the …rm who sells both products does not su¤er from internal competition between his own products. By contrast, in our model, because of the slot constraint, there is competition among all products including competition among products belonging to the same …rm. Bundling has an e¤ect of removing internal competition among products belonging to the same …rm and therefore every …rm can gain from bundling.
Furthermore, we believe that the two di¤erent models capture di¤erent real world situations. Whinston's model is well adapted to famous cases such as IBM's tying of tabulating machines with tabulating cards or Microsoft's tying of windows operating system with internet explorer. 27 In these examples, the incumbent is a monopoly in one market and faces competition in the other market and the two products tied together are not substitutes but complements. Our model is well adapted to competition among portfolios such as movies, cigarettes, foods whenever their distributors have limited slots due to limited attention of consumer or limited shelf space. For instance, the leverage theory was originally applied to the movie industry when the Supreme Court prohibited block booking. However, in the case of movies, it is not realistic to assume that movies produced by Paramount Pictures do not compete among themselves while some of them compete with movies produced by other studios. It would be reasonable, as a …rst approximation, to assume that all movies compete among themselves as we do in our model.
Consider now exclusive dealing (or slotting contracts). Our results suggest that exclusive dealing can be a direct instrument of foreclosure. For instance, consider digital goods. Since, then in the absence of slotting contracts, all equilibria are e¢ cient and each …rm realizes at least the pro…t of the technology-renting equilibrium (proposition 5(i)). However, if slotting contracts are allowed, a …rm can buy all slots and foreclose rival …rms if this is in his interest.
Conclusions
Our analysis generates clear-cut policy implications for digital goods. Bundling or block booking is socially desirable for e¢ cient allocation of slots and is quite unlikely to be an instrument of foreclosure. On the contrary, slotting contracts (or exclusive dealing) are socially undesirable for e¢ cient allocation of slots and can provide a direct instrument of foreclosure.
As challenging issues for future studies, it would be interesting to explore dynamic implications of the portfolio e¤ects in a setting in which we endogeneize the portfolio of each …rm. We can also model the buyer as a downstream …rm and study the …rm's pricing with respect to …nal consumers. Even in a setting with a monopoly downstream …rm, we can study the interaction between bundling at upstream level and bundling at downstream level. Of course, it would be more interesting to extend this monopoly setting to competition between downstream …rms, which is very relevant for cable or digital TV. …rms 1 products of values w k q F B 1 +1 1 ; :::; w q 1 . This changes the buyer's payo¤ by
We note that the set fu c, 0 is non-negative. In this way we have proved that the buyer buys at least one product of …rm 1, and then pays the …xed fee F 1 . This reveals that the buyer buys at least all the products in B F B i , i = 1; :::; n F B . But since the buyer will not buy more than k products, it must be the case that she buys B F B Step 2 When each …rm i plays tr i , …rm j cannot make a pro…t larger than F j . We prove this claim for …rm 1, and the same argument applies for i = 2; :::; n F B . From Lemma 1, it is enough to consider …rm 1's deviation in the set of technology-renting strategy T R 1 . Obviously, …rm 1 has no incentive to decrease F 1 from F 1 . We now prove that …rm 1 has no incentive to increase F 1 from F 1 . Note …rst that from the fact F i makes the buyer indi¤erent between renting i's technology or not, the buyer can achieve the payo¤ equal to 0 without buying any product from …rm i for any given i = 1; :::; n F B . Suppose now that …rm 1 chooses F 1 = F 1 + " for " > 0. We need to prove that the buyer will not buy any product from 1. The buyer can make a pro…t of 0 by buying only from …rms 1, and she cannot make a pro…t 0 by buying one or more products from 1 (given F 1 = F 1 + "), because if she could then she would make at least pro…t + " > 0 before the deviation of 1: a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that a NE (s 1 ; :::; s n ) exists such that the buyer buys a portfolio of products B = B 1 [ ::: [ B n and, for instance, B 1 does not include all the products in B F B 1 ; that is, B F B 1 nB 1 6 = ;. Let 1 denote the pro…t of …rm 1 and let 0 denote the buyer's payo¤ in this NE. Consider now the strategy tr 1 2 T R 1 of …rm 1 with F 1 = 1 + " for " > 0 and small. We below prove that the buyer buys at least one product from …rm 1, and therefore 1's pro…t increases to 1 + ". In order to prove this, we …rst note that if the buyer does not buy any product from 1, she cannot make a payo¤ higher than 0 [otherwise she would not buy B given (s 1 ; :::; s n )]. Then it su¢ ces to show that the buyer can earn more than 0 by purchasing B [ f1jg, with 1j 2 B F B 1 nB 1 , which includes at least one product o¤ered by …rm 1. Consider …rst the case in which #(B) < k. Then, the buyer's payo¤ from buying B [ f1jg is equal to 0 + u j 1 c ", which is larger than 0 since 1j 2 B F B implies u j 1 > c. Consider now the case in which #(B) = k. In this case, the buyer's payo¤ from B [ f1jg is 0 + u j 1 " c u j 0 h , where hj 0 denotes the lowest valued product in B, which the buyer removes from one slot to make room for product 1j. We know that u j 
Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that a NE exists such that the buyer buys B = B 1 [ ::: [ B n and, for instance, B 1 does not include all the products in B F B 1 ; there exists a product 1j 2 B F B 1 nB 1 . Let 1 denote the pro…t of …rm 1 in this NE, while 0 represents the buyer's payo¤ in the NE. Consider the strategy of …rm 1 in T R 1 such that F 1 = 1 + " (for " > 0 and small). In order to prove that this is a pro…table deviation for 1, it su¢ ces to show that the buyer buys at least one product from …rm 1, as this yields 1 a pro…t of 1 + " which is larger than 1 . Note …rst that in the case in which the buyer does not buy any product from 1, she can make at most a pro…t equal to 0 . (2). Thus, after 1's deviation, the buyer will buy at least one product of 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) In the case of digital goods, in the worst case in which the buyer bought all the other products, seller i can realize a pro…t of F i . Therefore, F i is a lower bound of the pro…t that seller i can realize.
(ii) The proof is by contradiction. Suppose there exists a NE such that 1 makes a pro…t higher than
. Precisely, suppose that 1 sells a bundle B 1 B 1 such that q 1 = #B 1 , and 2 sells a bundle B 2 B 2 such that q 2 = #B 2 . Then 1's revenue P 1 (B 1 ) is larger than F 1 + cq 1 , while 2's revenue is P 2 P 2 (B 2 ). The payo¤ of the buyer is X
and it is clear that this is smaller than X 1j2B 1 u j 1 + X 2j2B 2 u j 2 (F 1 + cq 1 ) P 2 since P 1 (B 1 ) > F 1 + cq 1 . We prove that the latter inequality implies the existence of a pro…table deviation for …rm 2. Let 2 deviate by using a technology renting strategy with F 2 = P 2 cq 2 + ", with " > 0 and small. Since in the candidate NE considered in the beginning the pro…t of 2 is equal to P 2 cq 2 , this deviation of 2 is pro…table if and only if the buyer buys at least one object from 2. In order to prove that this is the case, we notice that if the buyer does not buy anything from …rm 2, then she buys only bundles o¤ered by 1, and they cannot yield the buyer a payo¤ larger than otherwise we obtain a contradiction with the fact that the initial candidate is a NE. LetB 2 denote the bundle of 2 which includes his best k 2 = q F B 2 + q SB 1 products. We show below that the buyer's pro…t if she buys onlyB 2 is larger than , and thus we infer that she will de…nitely buy at least one product from …rm 2.
Suppose for the moment that " = 0. Then the payo¤ of the buyer from buying onlyB 2 is k 2 X j=1 u j 2 P 2 c(k 2 q 2 ) and we below prove ; then, since > , we obtain > for the case in which " = 0, which implies that > holds for "(> 0) small. The inequality is equivalent to This inequality is obviously satis…ed by de…nition of q F B 1 ; q F B 2 . (iii) Here we prove that when …rms are required to satisfy (2), in any NE the pro…t of …rm i is at least F i . This result holds for any n 2, but in the case of n = 2 [jointly with (ii)] it implies the statement in Proposition 5(iii). 28 
